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 Besides the infamous abduction of the 276 Chibok girls, little is known internationally 
about Boko Haram. However tens of thousands have been killed because of this terrorist 
organization. The purpose of this thesis is to identify how Boko Haram selects and obtains 
new recruits in order to prevent future recruitment from occurring. The scope of this thesis is 
examined through theories such as rational choice, frustration aggression, narcissistic rage, 
relative deprivation, class theory, functionalism, tribal particularism, and Stockholm 
syndrome. The methodology of this project included observational textual analysis, discourse 
analysis, and historical observations, all of which were obtained through peer-reviewed 
articles, news sources, and interview recordings with both current and former Boko Haram 
members as well as Boko Haram victims. It is through these sources that I discovered Boko 
Haram recruits its members by taking advantage of ethnic fissures, rationality, limited 
economic opportunity, and alienation from the Nigerian government as well as through 
abduction utilizing Stockholm syndrome. By identifying these recruitment tactics, a policy 
recommendation was constructed in order to help advise the effort to cut off Boko Haram’s 
most valuable resource – people.





There are copious differences among terrorist groups. One of these differences is in 
terrorist recruitment. Terrorism is much more likely to be used when combatants have 
asymmetric numerical strength and weaponry. As a result, the survival of the organization 
depends on the recruitment of others. By analyzing a terrorist organization’s recruitment 
methods, we can possibly discover how to demographically starve such organizations’ main 
resource – people. In this thesis, I question how Boko Haram recruits its members. The reason 
for studying specifically Boko Haram, rather than other terrorist organizations, is the 
significant amount of neglect from the international community and the academic literature. 
This thesis is important because the international community can make an impact if the 
appropriate steps are taken to neutralize Boko Haram. It analyzes the tactics Boko Haram 
deploys in recruiting new terrorists. It also assesses who the target population is for Boko 
Haram, why they are targeted, and where, both geographically and demographically, Boko 
Haram obtains such members.  
I expect to find that Nigeria’s ethnic fissures, the role of unequal distribution of power, 
and the alienation of the Nigerian military due to its brutal counter-terrorism tactics are 
fueling Boko Haram’s recruitment. I also expect to discover a recruitment mechanism which 
feeds off of repression, limited economic opportunity, rationality, a particular tribalism, and 
Stockholm syndrome. For this thesis, the methodology I use involves in-depth qualitative data 
about Boko Haram over the past decade in literature and news sources. I argue that Boko 
Haram’s recruitment mechanism forces civilians into submitting to their will. Furthermore, I 
hypothesize that the methods deployed by Boko Haram leaders and members stem from tribal 
traditions.            




 I will first review the key terms and concepts such as terrorism and those individuals 
involved in terrorism. After this I will give a brief overview of Boko Haram. This will be 
followed by a literature review that will analyze the main theories for terrorist recruitment as 
they apply to Boko Haram. Subsequently, the methodology and research design behind this 
thesis will be explained. In order to give critical background knowledge, a history of the 
relationship between Nigeria and Boko Haram will be next. Next I will discuss the results and 
analysis of my thesis in regards to tribal particularism, alienation of the Nigerian government, 
common recruitment tactics, the changing of Boko Haram’s recruitment mechanisms, and the 
group’s use of Stockholm syndrome. In conclusion a policy brief will be provided at the end 
advising the Nigerian government on how to stem the flow of Boko Haram recruits given the 
results of my thesis.  
 A. Key Terms and Concepts  
It is easy to lump “terrorists” together. However, there is no standard and universally 
accepted definition of terrorism. A common quip states, “One man’s terrorist is another man’s 
freedom fighter.” For this thesis, I will have to create a boundary between and distinguish 
between soldiers, criminals, vigilantes, warriors, terrorists and everything in between. The 
Federal Bureau of Investigation defines terrorism as, “violent acts or acts dangerous to human 
life that violate federal or state law,” that, “appear to be intended to intimidate or coerce a 
civilian population.”1 These violent acts, “affect the conduct of a government by mass 
destruction, assassination, or kidnapping.”2 Similarly, the Central Intelligence Agency defines 
                                                 
1 “Terrorism.” FBI. 2016. Accessed November 13, 2016. https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/terrorism. 
2 “Terrorism.” FBI. 2016. 




terrorism as, “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant 
targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents.”3  
According to the government of Nigeria, a terrorist is defined as:  
Anyone who [is] involved or who causes an attack upon a person’s life which may 
cause serious bodily harm or death; kidnapping of a person; destruction to a 
government or public facility, transport system, an infrastructural facility including an 
information system, a fixed platform located on the intercontinental shelf, public place 
or private property likely to endanger human life or result in major economic loss.4 
 
The Nigerian government’s definition of terrorism aligns with the idealist school of 
thought, which stresses the fact that every act that produces fear, terror, or death – whether 
legitimately carried out or not – by an individual, group, or state is an act of terrorism. The 
realist school of thought, on the other hand, sees terrorism essentially as an attack by 
clandestine groups on non-combatants or civilians in order to draw attention to themselves 
and their cause, by imbuing fear in the public to coerce a state actor to carry out an action for 
their political objectives.  
Title 22 United States Code (USC) Section 2656 (f) provides a realist definition of 
terrorism by the United States. According to Title 22, “Terrorism is defined as premeditated, 
politically motivated violence perpetuated against non-combatant targets by sub-national or 
clandestine agents usually intended to influence an audience.” The U.S. Department of 
Defense states that a terrorist group creates fear to try to persuade people to its will. More 
specifically, a terrorist group, as defined by the U.S. Department of Defense, is a group that 
uses, “the unlawful use of violence or threat of violence to instill fear and coerce governments 
or societies,” and is, “often motivated by religious, political, or other ideological beliefs and 
                                                 
3 “Terrorism FAQs.” Central Intelligence Agency. 2013. Accessed November 13, 2016. 
https://www.cia.gov/news-information/cia-the-war-on-terrorism/terrorism-faqs.html. 
4 An Act To Make Provisions For And About Offences Relating To Conduct Carried Out Or Purposes 
Connected With Terrorism, Act No. 10, National Assembly of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (2011) 




committed in the pursuit of goals that are usually political.”5 A. A. Akanni affirms this 
through his definition of terrorism stating, “Terrorism is a deliberate and systematic use of 
violence designed to destroy, kill, maim and intimidate the innocent in order to achieve a goal 
or draw national/international attention.”6 Based on this realist perspective and criterion, the 
Boko Haram can indeed be seen as a terrorist group in Nigeria. I will choose to identify 
terrorist groups as those who inflict unlawful violence or threaten the use of violence to instill 
fear and coerce governments or societies, as defined by the Department of Defense, as one in 
the same. I will be defining terrorism under a realist perspective for the remainder of this 
thesis.           
 Liʼat Levanon makes a crucial point in his literature, noting that a distinction must be 
made between those who are actively partaking in outright terrorism, the members of the 
terrorist organization, and those civilians supporting it. However, Levanon points out that 
terrorist organizations can be “mixed” organizations, meaning they carrying out both terrorist 
and civilian activities.7 Recruitment in this paper will be defined as the action of enlisting new 
people who, willingly and unwillingly, join an organization to engage in terrorism related 
activity. However, recruitment will not be defined as the action of cultivating civilian 
sympathizers. Although Boko Haram may, and most likely does, obtain sympathizers, the 
interest of this paper will remain on how Boko Haram recruits those who participate in acts of 
terrorism.          
 These recruits participate as members by, “support[ing] the organization through 
                                                 
5 U.S. Department of Defense. Joint Chiefs of State. Antiterrorism. Joint Publication 3-07.2, 2010. 
6A. A. Akanni, “History of Terrorism, Youth Psychology and Unemployment in Nigeria.” The Journal 
of Pan African Studies 7, no. 3 (September 2014): 66-76. Accessed August 5, 2016. EBSCOhost. 
7Liʼat  Levanon,. Membership in a Terrorist Organization. Jerusalem: Ha-Makhon Ha-Yiśreʼeli Le-
Demokṛatỵah, 2012. 




finances, weapons, intelligence, etc. and are engaging in terrorism-related activity.”8 Although 
sympathizers may contribute to acts of terror, support itself is difficult to identify as an act of 
terror. This support can include advocating for the organization, but once a sympathizer 
engages in terrorism-related activity, he or she becomes a member of the terrorist 
organization. For example, one can be an avid supporter of Boko Haram and believe in Salafi 
extremism. However, if he or she has not committed or engaged in violent activity, or 
provided to Boko Haram monetarily, then they are not a terrorist. Having the same ideology 
does not make one a terrorist or member of an organization.    
 B. “Boko Haram”        
 Boko Haram is located primarily in Nigeria and West Africa. Boko Haram is a 
religiously motivated terrorist group inspired by a sect of Islam called Salafi Jihadism.9 The 
word “boko” in the Hausa language translates to book, and “haram” in Arabic translates to 
something that is prohibited, inviolable, or forbidden.10 Put together, the name implies that 
books are forbidden.11 Under this banner, Boko Haram has killed tens of thousands of people 
over the past decade. The violence committed by Boko Haram in Nigeria has grown 
exponentially and is an everyday occurrence with the purpose of striking fear, intimidating 
and coercing the people of Nigeria to submit to their ways.      
 As a result of belief in Salafi Jihadism, Boko Haram believes in establishing Nigeria as 
                                                 
8 Levanon, Membership in a Terrorist Organization. 
9 A particular sect of Islam that enables the Boko Haram to act on its beliefs. To learn more in-depth 
about Boko Haram’s theology and how it signifies its beliefs look to my other thesis titled “Boko Haram: Using 
Salafism as a Weapon of Violence”  
10A Chadic language, with about 39 million speakers, mostly within Africa. 
11 Ali S., Yusufu Bagaji. Moses Shaibu Etila, Elijah E. Ogbadu, and Jafa’aru Garba Sule. “Boko Haram 
and the Recurring Bomb Attacks in Nigeria: Attempt to Impose Religious Ideology through Terrorism?” Cross-
cultural Communication 8.1 (2012): 33-41. ProQuest. Web. 1 Mar. 2016. 




a caliphate.12 The Salafi Jihadist movement grew out of the perpetuation of a caliphate and 
currently relies on key sources the like Taqi al-Din Ibn Taymiyya theological and life 
perspectives13, Ibn Taymiyya, a 13th to 14th century religious scholar of Sunni jurisprudence, 
encouraged violent Jihadism on the grounds of tawhid14 and the belief that Allah’s law was 
sovereign.15 As a result, Salafi Jihadist groups like Boko Haram similarly call for the return of 
the caliphate and the imposing of Shar’ia law.16 Members of Boko Haram are willing to die 
because they believe that, “legislation comes from God; in a democracy, this capacity is given 
to the people.” As a result, democracy is viewed as a new religion centered on making the, 
“people into gods and giving them God’s rights and attributes.”17 As a consequence Jihadists 
try to correct this blasphemy.  
This terroristic religious motivation is built upon Boko Haram’s narrative or, “social 
realities, particularly in terms of defining subjects and establishing their relational positions within a 
system of signification,”18 and critically depends upon sacred texts and history.19 Narratives, “are so 
ingrained in cultures that they are an essential part of people’s identity and ‘who they are.’”20 These 
operating narratives are often fluid and able to be reinterpreted by individuals and groups.21  
                                                 
12 An area containing an Islamic steward known as a caliph who is a person considered a religious 
successor to the Islamic prophet, Muhammad. 
13 Roel Meijer, Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 
152.; Patrick Sookhdeo, Global Jihad: The Future in the Face of Militant Islam, (Virginia: Isaac Publishing, 2007), 76-77. 
14 Meaning the oneness of God. 
15 Sookhdeo, Global Jihad, 76-77. 
16 The body of Islamic law. The “way” or “path”; it is the legal framework within which the public and 
some private aspects of life are regulated for those living in a legal system based on Islam. 
17Sookhdeo, Global Jihad, 76-77. 
18 Richard Jackson, “Constructing Enemies: ‘Islamic Terrorism’ in Political and Academic 
Discourse”, Government and Opposition 42, (2007), 396.  
19 Jeffrey R. Halverson, H.L. Goodall Jr. and Steven R. Corman, Master Narratives of Islamist Extremism, (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011). 
20 Halverson,. Master Narratives of Islamist Extremism. 
21 Dina Al Raffie, “Journal of Terrorism Research.” Whose Hearts and Minds? Narratives and Counter-
Narratives of Salafi Jihadism, 34. September 22, 2012. Accessed February 20, 2016. http://jtr.st-
andrews.ac.uk/articles/10.15664/jtr.304/. 




Salafi Jihadism is a particular sect of Islam that enables the Boko Haram to act on its 
own beliefs. Salafism comes from the word “salaf” in Arabic.22 Salaf is the term used for 
forefathers or ancestors of those collective generations who lived around the beginning of the 
Islamic practice.23 Salafi followers consider believers during this time period to be 
practitioners of the purest form of Islam.24 As a result, believers try to emulate the Salaf 
generations by following Salaf laws, tenets, morality, and even textual interpretations of the 
Quran and Hadith.25 The models for the Salaf generation, the Quran, Hadith and ijma26 of the 
ulama27 are seen as true Islam. Militant Islamists or Salafi Jihadists call for doctrinal purity 
and for literal interpretation of the Quran.  
Boko Haram’s Salafi Jihadist leader, Abubakar Shekau, has lead the group to success 
and established it as a force with which to be reckoned. Boko Haram continues to grow 
despite the Nigerian army’s efforts to dismantle it. This successful track record of the terrorist 
organization must be studied to understand how to defeat the terrorist group. The group’s 
efforts amount to thousands of casualties and abductions each year. Boko Haram also acts 
outside of Nigeria, continuing to move and control different territories within West Africa. 
Most importantly, it is has gained recognition from ISIS while remaining under the radar of 
the international community with the exception of the abduction of the 276 Chibok girls.  
II. Literature Review 
Many look for a reason as to why people join terrorist organizations. There are many 
different theories behind what fuels terrorist recruitment. In order to prevail in finding our 
                                                 
22 Meijer, Global Salafism, 152.  
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. 
25 A collection of the reports or accounts claiming to quote what the prophet Muhammad said. 
26 An Arabic term referring to the consensus or agreement of the Muslim scholars on religious issues.  
27 A body of Muslim scholars recognized as having specialized knowledge of Islamic sacred law and 
theology. 




correct lens to focus on Boko Haram’s recruitment, it is necessary to review many of the 
major theories surrounding it. One theory I believe can explain terrorist recruitment is rational 
choice. Nigeria’s ethnic fissures, the role of unequal distribution of power, and the alienation 
of the Nigerian military that are fueling Boko Haram’s recruitment can be explained by the 
individuals’ decisions to join Boko Haram.  
Mark L. Lichbach’s influence with rational choice theory in “Rational 
Revolutionaries,” employed an individual bottom up approach. Lichbach claims that hardship 
is not a required or ample excuse for political violence.28 As a result he dismisses relative 
deprivation theory with logical collective action. Lichbach also claims that incentives chosen 
by individuals are the major motivation for individuals to take part in political violence. It is 
through this that rational choice holds that individuals select their actions so that they can 
obtain their goals, given their beliefs about what strategies are the most effective.  Rational 
choice theory tries to make that case that those who join terrorist organizations are actually 
just making a logical decision. Each person examines the positives and negatives of joining a 
terrorist group and then determines the best logical choice that serves their own interests. 
Pamala L. Griset and Sue Mahan argue that individual effort to join in terrorism 
activity can, “follow logical [a] processes that can be discovered and explained.”29 The 
individual has preferences between the choices that are available to him. As a result, “The 
resort to violence as a willful choice [is] made.”30 A recruit processes the available 
information, such as the positives and negatives of joining, and determines his or her best 
                                                 
28 Mark I. Lichbach, “What Makes Rational Peasants Revolutionary? Dilemma, Paradox, and Irony in 
Peasant Collective Action.” World Politics 46, no. 03 (1994): 383-418. Accessed October 20, 2016. 
doi:10.2307/2950687. 
29 Pamala L. Griset, and Sue Mahan. Terrorism in Perspective. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 
2003. 
30 Griset, Terrorism in Perspective. 




course of action. However, the argument may arise that if an individual is indeed a rational 
person, then, why would he join a terrorist organization? Griset and Mahan explain how 
rationality can be relative. They state, “People realize that their participation is important 
because group size and cohesion matter” and that they, “perceive their personal influence on,” 
the public to be for the overall good.31 Griset and Mahan go even as far as to state that people 
“choose terrorism when they want immediate action. They think that only violence can build 
organizations and mobilize supporters, and accept the risks of challenging the government in a 
particularly provocative way.”32 However, Griset and Mahan qualify that, “the choice of 
terrorism involves considerations of timing and of the popular contribution to revolt, as well 
as of the relationship between government and opponents.”33    
Many choose to join terrorist groups because of various individual factors. Individual 
circumstances that make it more likely to join Boko Haram could be anything from struggling 
to support a family financially, wanting to learn more about Islam, or even revenge. However, 
as John Scott shows, the problem with rational choice theory is that these individual factors 
can create patterns. Therefore, “Social structures can be understood as chains of 
interconnection,” that can reflect common sources of influence on those who join terrorist 
organizations.34 Some would even argue that rational choice theory does not really explain a 
terrorist group’s action in recruiting but the mindset of the individual joining.  With this being 
said, I believe that even if patterns emerge from social structures, which I argue they do, it 
still does not diminish the fact that the individual chose to be a part of a terrorist organization. 
                                                 
31 Griset, Terrorism in Perspective. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. 
34 John Scott, and F. Webster. “Rational Choice Theory.” Web.archive.org. 2000. Accessed August 27, 
2016. 




As for the assumption that rational choice does not explain terrorist recruitment, I would argue 
that terrorist groups are indeed responsible for this. Groups like Boko Haram can create an 
environment in which citizens doubt their government. Terrorist groups can also proclaim 
who they are and their beliefs, attracting those who deem the group a rational choice. 
 Sigmund Freud and Dollard Dupe provide another theory, as to why people participate 
in terrorism. Frustration aggression theory suggests that when frustration sets into the 
community as a whole, it can lead to aggressive behavior. As a result, the researcher is left to 
try to discover the source of frustration, which Akanni believes, “happens when people do not 
have enough to survive.”35 This feeling of frustration usually produces, “militant or violent 
laden consciousness,” in people. Although I do expect to discover a Boko Haram recruitment 
mechanism which feeds off of repression and limited economic opportunity, I do not believe 
that relative repression causes people to join terrorist organizations. Given that, there are other 
parts of countries where terrorism exists and other places around the world that are going 
through repression worse than, “those who are frustrated with the position they are in,” that 
still do not revert to violence.   
 Akanni also notes that this is very similar to narcissistic rage theory. Narcissistic rage 
theory is based on, “a reaction to narcissistic injury, which is a perceived threat to a 
narcissist’s self-esteem or self-worth.”36 When applied to terrorism, Akanni shows that 
terrorists experience a “form of ‘displacement.’”37 This theory focuses on individuals who 
pursue gratification from vanity or egotistic admiration of one's own attributes. When 
narcissists are blocked from this gratification and perceive someone or something as a threat, 
                                                 
35 Akanni, “History of Terrorism, Youth Psychology and Unemployment in Nigeria.”  
36 Ibid.  
37 Ibid. 




they act out and seek revenge against it or them. This could apply to countries, which are very 
impoverished, that house terrorist groups. However, Vaaseh explains that this frustration does 
not necessarily have to come from a lack of economic resources, but can come from, 
“injustice, lack of good livelihood opportunities, discrimination, marginalization, lack of 
education, and other basic necessities of life.”38 Following the logic of narcissistic rage 
theory, all those who joined terrorist organizations would be considered narcissists. However, 
much of what some religious terrorist groups argue is not for personal status or 
economic/material reasons, but mainly religious considerations. Therefore, we cannot assume 
that everyone joining a terrorist organization, like Boko Haram, perceive a threat to self-
esteem or self-worth and seeks revenge through a terrorist group.    
Relative deprivation theory adds onto frustration aggression and pushes aside 
weaknesses of the theory in that people may be worse off than others and still not resort to 
violence. Relative deprivation theory relies on the fact that people compare themselves to 
other people and think they are worse off than those people. Relative deprivation theory 
asserts that people who have good livelihoods can still feel as though they are worse off than 
others become frustrated and act out on this frustration. Ted Gurr, author of “Why Men 
Rebel,” makes the claim that a divide between, “expected and achieved welfare creates 
collective discontent.”39 Individuals begin to compare themselves to those around them and 
begin to believe themselves inferior. Gurr claims this discontent is a result of, “perceived 
discrepancy between value expectations and value capabilities.”40 It does not matter if a 
                                                 
38 Godwin A. Vaaseh,. “Political Uncertainty And Violence In Nigeria: Politicising The Boko Haram 
Insurgency In Northeastern Nigeria.” International Journal Of Arts & Sciences 8, no. 8 (December 2015): 403-
416. Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed September 26, 2016). 
39 Ted Robert Gurr,. Why Men Rebel. Princeton, NJ: Center of International Studies, Princeton UP, 
1970.  
40 Gurr, Why Men Rebel.  




person is the least deprived person in a country, as long as he feels deprived. Gurr states 
relative deprivation, “is the term ... used to denote the tension that develops from a 
discrepancy between the ‘ought’ and the ‘is’ of collective value satisfaction, and that disposes 
men to violence.”41 This can lead to individuals joining terrorist groups to obtain what they 
want relatively quickly and through force. However, improved as this theory may be over 
frustration aggression theory, it still does not explain why so many who are deprived or feel 
deprived still do not join terrorist organizations. For example, while a person may be 
deprived, they can at the same time desire to avoid conflict.  
Ayodeji Bayo Ogunrotifa proposes a different theory to terrorism recruitment than 
Gurr. He proposes that the root of the problem lies with the classes, as seen in his hypothesis 
of class theory. One will find this theory is quite tailored to its founder, Karl Marx. Class 
theory maintains that all of a society’s problems and issues are a result of class. The theory 
separates people into two categories: the haves and the have-nots. The have-nots end up 
revolting against the haves as a result of oppression and their current state. Ogunrotifa claims 
that social class relations are producing a “ruling class and their counterpart.”42 He provides 
the analogies of the, “freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and serf, guild-master 
and journeyman, in a word, oppressor and oppressed, stood in constant opposition to one 
another, carried on and uninterrupted.”43 As a result of these relations, each group poses a 
threat to the other and therefore is forced to resort to violence.  
For example, Ogunrotifa presents: 
[B]ecause of the danger that could be posed to the ruling class in power in west Africa 
                                                 
41 Gurr, Why Men Rebel. 
42 Ayodeji Bayo Ogunrotifa,. “Class Theory of Terrorism: A Study of Boko Haram Insurgency In 
Nigeria.” Research on Humanities and Social Sciences 3, no. 1 (February 2013): 1-35. Accessed September 2, 
2016. EBSCOhost. 
43 Bayo Ogunrotifa,. “Class Theory of Terrorism: A Study of Boko Haram Insurgency In Nigeria.” 




(who are unrepentant stooges and allies of Western capitalist ruling class), Nigerian 
government announced the receipt of military aid in the training and re-training of 
military personnel, fixing of military jets, and acquisition of new boats, helicopters and 
technological devices that would be used in fighting Boko Haram.44 
However, there are flaws with this theory. One of these flaws is that it assumes that 
there is strictly a ruling elite and strictly a counterpart. This means that the two fighting 
groups cannot be a mix of those who rule and those who do not. Furthermore, it would seem 
as though the majority of the elite and the majority of the counterpart would need to be 
fighting against one another to make this claim.     
 Functionalist theory provides a much broader view than class theory. This theory 
generalizes that society, as a whole, is affected by many interacting independent factors. 
Godwin Vaaseh explains that functionalist theory assumes that society is a conglomerate of, 
“different interacting independent parts.”45 These independent parts each have a certain 
purpose in human societies’ need for stability, “in maintaining peace and progress and 
security of the society as a whole.”46 Functionalist theory explains why there is so much 
hardship in trying to get a nation to unify when there is such a wide demographic of people in 
a country. Functionalist theory shows why a terrorist group is able to unify together in such 
diverse societies and attract people from all forms of demographics. This explains why 
terrorist organizations break away from other societies and start to build their own instead. 
Because of diverse populations, it is sensible that people have different reasons for joining a 
terrorist organization. Still, many would criticize that this theory does not adequately explain 
why terrorist groups form in the first place. However, with this being said, the theory is still 
                                                 
44 Bayo Ogunrotifa, “Class Theory of Terrorism: A Study of Boko Haram Insurgency In Nigeria.” 
45 Vaaseh,. “Political Uncertainty And Violence In Nigeria: Politicising The Boko Haram Insurgency In 
Northeastern Nigeria.” 
46  Ibid. 




relevant in explaining how a terrorist group is able to function, survive, and attract 
individuals.    
 David Cook focuses more specifically on why people join terrorist organizations. 
Cook examines tribal particularism theory. This theory, specific to Boko Haram, examines 
how ethnic differences can play a part in terrorism recruitment. It reflects how a group 
transfers their aggression from another oppressed and frustrated group of which they were 
also a part. That is to say, a group of people will channel the frustrations of a particular 
people-group or tribe. This theory however solely relies on whether or not the group of people 
acting out share a common identity from their collective oppressed past. The theory revolves 
around the question of why most impoverished West African tribes have not produced violent 
groups. Cook argues that terrorist groups can channel, “frustrations,” from, “a particular 
people-group,” of which they used to be a part.47 For example, terrorist organizations can be a 
result of a rivalry between ethno-religious societies just like the genocide in Rwanda. Cook 
explains that this tension could be because there is deep, “resentment against traditional 
elites,” as part of an ethno-religious society.48 I believe much of the current recruitment in 
certain organizations can be explained by the religio-ethnic and tribal divides which is 
perpetuating societies to produce violence. This would also explain why many do not leave 
once recruited, because they feel a sense of identity in the group.   
Although this is a relatively new hypothesis, there are still criticisms. One weakness is 
that a violent group may not be fully made up of a certain group or tribal identity. For 
example, terrorist groups made up of different individuals from different backgrounds could 
                                                 
47 David Cook. “Boko Haram: A New Islamic State in Nigeria.” James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, 
December 11, 2014, 1-30. Accessed August 4, 2016. EBSCOhost. 
48 Cook,. “Boko Haram: A New Islamic State in Nigeria.” 




negate this theory. However, I would argue that while there may not be a majority of a 
particular tribe, it does not take away the fact that the terrorist group may still channel a 
certain tribe’s anger. This can even be the case if a majority of the members of the group and 
those that continue to join the group are not associated with the tribe. Another criticism is that 
this theory usually does not explain why some violent groups do not transfer practices from 
their origin and form new practices.49 This would lead one to assume that the terrorist group 
does not derive its anger from a particular group identity. However, I attribute this lack of 
comparable practices as a lack of evidence found or discovered to make these connections.  
There are not many studies conducted on the phenomenon of Stockholm syndrome 
within terrorism. This is primarily because studies can only be through distant observation. 
Victims usually turn from seeing their captors taking life to captors giving it.50 This is a 
phenomenon where hostages show positive feelings, empathy, and sympathy towards captors. 
In Stockholm syndrome, the captor, “serves as a mother figure protecting her child from a 
threatening outside world, including law enforcement’s deadly weapons.”51 Captives can be 
seen identifying and defending their captors. This unusual irrationality emerges when the 
victim is in danger. Often as a result, those who abduct individuals can find themselves being 
supported by those who they kidnapped and even find their victims not wanting to be rescued. 
The same can be said for terrorists who kidnap boys and girls for recruitment. Terrorists wish 
to make their newly acquired able-bodied captives accept them. Freud claims that individuals 
go through a defense mechanism that allows them to, “guard or distance themselves from and 
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remain consciously unaware of unpleasant thoughts, feelings, and desires.”52 As a result, some 
of those abducted by terrorists can be found helping them, blocking out what the terrorists did 
to them and even choosing to remain with them. However, many claim the weakness of this 
phenomenon is that it is hard to prove these captives did not have biased leaning towards the 
terrorists before they were abducted. Furthermore, captives who die in assisting their captors 
cannot be identified with Stockholm syndrome because they are now dead. However, I argue 
that through interviews with former terror organization members and captives, we can draw 
connections to the conditions created to form Stockholm syndrome, as outlined by the FBI 
law enforcement.           
 In this thesis, I attempt to prove that tribal particularism theory is why individuals join 
Boko Haram and how the terrorist organization’s recruiting targets a particular tribe. I will 
still maintain that some join Boko Haram from a rational choice perspective, and that others, 
not affiliated with the particular tribe, are coming together to form a stable group, in honor of 
functionalist perspective. Lastly, I attempt to prove that kidnappings and abductions 
committed by Boko Haram are done in an attempt to select and turn girls against their 
country, communities, and families.  
III. Methods and Research Design  
For my research design, I use a top-down approach in order to seek the root of why 
people join terrorist groups. In order to do this, I obtain my evidence through historical 
observation, textual analysis, and discourse analysis. I evaluate my evidence through 
qualitative research and content analysis. Historical observations, textual analysis, and 
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discourse analysis will be obtained through peer-reviewed articles, news sources, and 
interview recordings with Boko Haram members.  
One of the largest potential problems I encounter is validity. Sources and evidence 
may be biased in analysis. To combat this, I try to be as objective as possible in my selection 
and interpretation. Furthermore, I familiarize myself with the common biased trends of all 
sides of the argument and am aware of such leanings. However, it must be stated that there is 
no objective reality in one’s mind. As hard I may try, I may not be able to detach my emotions 
from these atrocities that I am investigating. One of the strengths of this research design is that 
it can provide details about terrorist recruit behavior, emotion, needs, desires, routines and 
personality characteristics that quantitative studies cannot match. The weakness, however, is 
that one cannot statistically prove any of the above assumptions. Furthermore, some of the 
sources are not first hand and may possibly contain their own bias. To combat this, I have 
included sources of first-hand accounts in interviews. Although some of these sources are too 
close to the situation to accurately examine it objectively. This is the reason for obtaining 
information from professional scholarly sources as well. 
IV.  History  
A. Nigeria  
 At first glance, Nigeria may not seem a typical place for terrorism to foster. Upon 
further inquiry, however, one can see that the narrative of Nigeria and its people is much more 
complex than could ever be imagined. Nigeria’s inter-connecting demographic and political 
factors allow for the situation Nigeria has found itself in today. As it will later be discovered, 
Boko Haram’s recruitment is and can be explained in part, by the history of Nigeria. 
 Compared to other countries, Nigeria is atypical because it harbors terrorism. Nigeria, 




as a country, has not been a failing state even with the presence of Boko Haram. Currently, 
Nigeria has a population of over 185 million people, and of that, nearly 43 percent are under 
the age of 15.53 It possesses the largest economy and military in Africa.54 In terms of 
geography, it is approximately twice the size of California.55 Its political geography reflects 
36 state governments and over 770 local governments.56 Nigeria’s population is roughly 50 
percent Muslim and 40 percent Christian with the remaining ten percent belonging to 
indigenous religions.57 There are more than 200 ethnic groups, each possessing “layers of 
authority and loyalty structures.”58 The main three ethnic groups, Hausa-Fulani, Igbo, and 
Yoruba, make up 80 percent of the population.59 As a country, it is very unique. Thus, Nigeria 
needs to be examined in a historical context.      
 When describing the state of Nigeria, it is important understand how the demography 
of Nigeria has changed over time. One cannot miss the rifts between religions and the 
Western world in Nigeria. As Stuart Elden points out, the rift between Islam and the Western 
world dates back to the 1800’s with British colonialism and the Sokoto Caliphate.60 The 
Sokoto Caliphate was founded by a Fulani leader named Usman dan Fodio. Usman dan Fodio, 
“Commander of the Faithful,” massed a successful revolt against the Northern Hausa 
kingdoms.61 As a result, a theocratic caliphate was formed. The caliphate was very critical of 
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Hausa elite, who were seen as greedy and corrupt.62 This is still an ideology that is held by 
northern impoverished ethnic societies. As time went on, however, the Sokoto Caliphate 
eventually became a, “loose confederation of about 30 emirates.”63    
 Eventually, when the British took control of the region, geographical lines were 
drawn. Bamidele Oluwaseun explains, “The amalgamation of the Northern and Southern 
protectorates in 1914 attracted an influx of southern migrants responding to the emerging 
economic opportunities in Kano, Kaduna, and Zaria.”64 As a result, eight million Muslims 
moved to Southern and Western regions of what is now Northern Nigeria and Cameroon, and 
two million Christians emigrated in the opposite directions.65   
 Demography was changing radically. This was partially because the ruling elite in the, 
“caliphate era were territorial and not open to the idea of allowing ‘strangers’ into their 
areas.”66 Furthermore, the British encouraged the preservation of the northern Islamic identity 
in order to avoid potential intergroup tensions.67 Although, in as much as the British tried 
solving tensions by drawing lines, many contentious ethnic and religious groups were not able 
to settle their differences and resorted to the use of violence in disputes. Furthermore, 
according to James Forest, in addition to the main three ethnic identities, the remaining ethno-
linguistic entities have been “historically marginalized and underrepresented among the 
political and economic elite.”68         
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 B. Setting a Backdrop for Boko Haram      
 In order to understand what terrorism is in the context of Boko Haram, one must 
understand the formation of the Boko Haram. Starting from the 19th century, leaders like the 
Nigerian Jihadist legacy of Uthman Dan Fodio played an influential role in this group’s 
formation. Azumah claims that Uthman “led a Fulani insurgency against the Hausa rulers of 
his day because the latter were deemed not to be Islamic enough.”69 In other words, Boko 
Haram’s terrorist group had historical Nigerian inspirations to spark and form an organization 
of Jihadists.          
 Boko Haram also found formation through the activism of other pre-founded groups 
within the Nigeria region such as Izala and Ahlus Sunna. Nigeria’s political discourse played 
a major role in the formation of the Izala movement. This movement provided Islamic 
political leaders like Bubakar Mahmud Gumi, a reformer of Uthman, “with the much needed 
organizational backing for his religio-political activism.”70 This cause and effect would 
eventually inspire Boko Haram. The chain of events is apparent with Azumah’s claim that 
“Ja’far Mahmoud Adam is one such Izala alumnus and Medina graduate who became a 
prominent Salafi-Ahlus Sunna leader in Northern Nigeria, and who, in turn, was the teacher of 
Muhammad Yusuf, the founder of Boko Haram.”71     
 Through certain leadership, groups like Boko Haram are able to obtain their 
inspirations. Many religions have different branches or sects within them. The same is true for 
Islam. Boko Haram resides within Salafism in Islam. “The popular discourses of Salafi 
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radicalism and Salafi counter-radicalism in Nigeria: a case study of Boko Haram”72 shows 
how Boko Haram tailors its sect for success. For example, Muhammed Yusuf’s reliance on 
Idn Taymizza, who is regarded by Salafi and Wahhabis as one of the most prominent 
authorities, helps enforce that Western education is forbidden and that employment by the 
government is also forbidden. These precepts encourage followers to commit to justified 
actions.           
 Boko Haram, however, no longer considers itself part of the Wahhabi Islam. Boko Haram 
now clings solely to Salafism because it refuses to subscribe to the interpretations of the Hanbali 
madhhab school of thought.  Haykel explains that the difference between Salafi and Wahhabis Islam 
helped create the Boko Haram. Haykel states the six central concepts to Salafism are tawhid,  shirk, 
bid’a,  takfir,  ijtihad,  and manhaj.73 All six of these concepts are central to Salafism. While 
Wahhabis, on the other hand, though similar in the six main aspects as Salafism, follows the Hanbali 
madhhab.74 Hanbali madhhab, though the smallest population size, is one of the four orthodox Sunni 
Islamic schools of jurisprudence.75 Salafi Muslims are usually divided between those who, in the name 
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of ijtihad, reject strict adherence to the four schools of law and those who fully accept it. This is why 
Muhammad Yusuf eventually broke away from his Salafi-Wahhabi taught leader Ja’far 
Mahmoud. Ja’far Mahmoud actively followed the Alhaji Muhammadu Ndimi mosque (an 
Ahlus Sunna mosque) in Maiduguri.76 Muhammad Yusuf, on the other hand, did not agree 
with following the Hanbali madhhab, and as a result, Boko Haram, due to its founder Yusuf, is 
solely Salafi Jihadist.                   
V. Results and Analysis         
 A. Examining Boko Haram’s Tribal Particularism    
 A common trend in the results was discovered in Boko Haram. A notable amount of 
individuals from the Kanuri tribe were and are recruited by Boko Haram.77 The Kanuri tribe 
makes up approximately four percent of Nigeria’s population.78 The tribe is primarily located 
in northeastern states of Nigeria and even northern Cameroon.79 Forest point out that “Kanuri 
also inhabit regions across the northern border into Niger, and there is evidence to suggest that 
these tribal relationships facilitate weapons trafficking and other cross-border smuggling 
transactions,” helping facilitate, “Boko Haram’s activities outside Nigeria.”80 There seems to 
be a connection with the tribe’s location and Boko Haram’s location. Forest states, “It has thus 
far proven difficult for the group to find sympathizers or anyone who would help them 
facilitate attacks further south, thus the majority of attacks have taken place within the 
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north.”81 In 2014, the Cameroon Defense Ministry claimed that Boko Haram was growing in 
and around the Lake Chad Region.82 As it happens, the Kanuri tribe dwells within this region 
heavily.83 This is primarily because of how integrated the Kanuri tribe is with Boko Haram. 
             
Kanuri is seen by some to be in revolt against the Fulani-Hausa domination of northern 
Islam.84 Forest explains that the Hausa and Fulani, who make up about 29% of the population, 
are more commonly found throughout most of Nigeria’s northern states and tend to be more 
westernized. Fulani-Hausa dominate northern Muslim leadership and reject and refuse to 
support Boko Haram. One can draw a connection between Kanuri and Boko Haram through 
shared tensions.          
 This shared tension can be linked to the westernization of Nigeria. Benjamin Barber 
explains that, “Tribalism and Reactionary Fundamentalism,” produces militants, “who detest 
modernity— the secular, scientific, rational and commercial civilization.”85 This reflects how 
the Kanuri tribe feels about the Fulani-Hausa dominated north. Onuoha claims that one of the 
reasons Boko Haram turned to violence was due, “to perceived political marginalization of the 
North and particularly the Northeast.”86 The Kanuri ethnic group is a large group in 
Northeastern Nigeria. Nigeria’s constitution requires that the Nigerian people receive equal 
geographic representation on a national level. However it has not, “sought greater 
representation for the Northeast within Nigeria’s democracy,” and has not been brought into 
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the national rhetoric. This attempt to include members of the tribe and area in the government 
shows that relative deprivation may not be the case, since they are being given a seat at the 
table. The Kanuri tribe rejects not only this system but the Northern dominated Fulani-Hausa 
society. The Kanuri tribe has been alienated from society, and Onuoha points out that the 
Kanuri tribe completely rejects this society.        
 The Kanuri group is blending with Boko Haram and visa-versa. Boko Haram has a 
kinship affinity for Kanuri.87 Akanni comments on this relationship saying, “As ethnic 
associations, they were based on strong loyalty and obligation to their kinship group.”88 When 
Boko Haram started using remote detonation bombs, attacking civilians, many Nigerians 
claimed Boko Haram, “must be making use of people from Niger or other African states, 
because no Nigerian would do this.”89 However, as we have learned, the Kanuri tribe does not 
see itself as a part of Nigeria but instead looks to its tribal identity. Akanni affirms this stating, 
“These associations were the organizational expression of strong, persistent feeling of loyalty 
and obligation to the kinship group, the town or village where the lineage is localized.”90 It is 
through this psychological and group identity relationship that we see Kanuri providing able-
bodied persons to Boko Haram, and Boko Haram protecting and up holding Kanuri tradition.
 Although there is some evidence to suggest Kanuri tribal particularism is occurring, 
there is evidence to contradict this as well. Elden claims that many Boko Haram members 
come from Chad and instead of speaking Kanuri speak Arabic.91 Onuha also affirms this 
statement claiming Boko Haram, “[D]raws followers across the 19 states of northern Nigeria, 
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Niger Republic, Chad and Sudan.”92 It can be seen that even these out of country members are 
not part of the Kanuri tribe. This aspect of member differentiation and diversity was predicted. 
However the last piece of evidence severely contradicts Kanuri tribal particularism. Though 
the Kanuri tribal detests some of the same things Boko Haram does, there is no evidence 
reflecting the same brutality Boko Haram uses against these topics. Boko Haram utilizes 
beheadings, massacres, and suicide bombings, while there is no evidence the Kanuri tribe uses 
such aggression.93 Cook exclaims that, “no evidence from traditional Kanuri practice or from 
the varieties of Islam known from the region would explain the extreme violence associated 
with Boko Haram.”94 This would suggest that Boko Haram does not reflect the same 
aggression the oppressed and frustrated Kanuri tribe expresses. This is to say we cannot 
conclusively claim that Boko Haram channels their frustrations through the Kanuri tribe, 
which would reflect a recruitment target group.       
 B. Nigeria helping Boko Haram Recruitment     
 The Federal Republic of Nigeria is often considered to be a victim of the terrorist 
organization, Boko Haram. However, the conflict between the two entities is much more 
complicated than what this perception implies. The government of Nigeria has contributed to 
the group’s power and establishment in the country both directly, through giving political 
influence to Boko Haram leaders, and indirectly, through its alienation of its citizens. 
 Following its return to democracy in 1999, Nigerian politicians contributed greatly to 
the formation of radical groups like Boko Haram. Vaaseh claims that they manipulated 
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religion to obtain political power.95 Northern politicians intentionally associated with ummah 
and Islamic clerics and promised to, “reform Islam, purge it of bad elements, and introduce 
Shar’ia and rule.”96 It was not uncommon for politicians to claim they were, “ready to die for 
Islam” or, “prepared to fight another civil war, [that they] cannot be blackmailed into killing 
Shar’ia.”97 This rhetoric is very reminiscent of the dedication that Boko Haram members have 
for their cause. Boko Haram, as a group, gained popularity among those with political and 
economic sway at this time.         
 Despite support from eminent political and economic heavyweights, Mohammed 
Yusuf was skeptical of the popularity gained through hobnobbing. By 2002, Yusuf had 
established a formidable sect. He denounced all forms of Western values, education, 
governance structures, inequality, corruption, distortions of Islamic practices, and 
manipulation of Islam in Nigeria, especially by corrupt politicians.98   
 Because of this skepticism, Yusuf had no qualms about utilizing these political 
agendas to benefit his group. After Boko Haram’s move from Kanama, Yobe state to 
Maiduguri in 2004, politicians and members of Boko Haram began interacting very 
intentionally. According the Vaaseh, Boko Haram overwhelmed the constituency of these 
politicians and, “The large concentration of able bodied youth and its widespread nature 
across many Borno and Yobe states communities,” led candidates to campaign in and around 
Boko Haram. Prior to 2005, power-hungry candidates became corrupt and offered important 
political appointments to prominent Boko Haram members in Borno and Yobe states.99 For 
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example, senior Boko Haram member Late Boju Foi was appointed a commissioner by former 
Governor Ali Modu Sheriff.100 This appointment and others like it directly gave dedicated 
Boko Haram members a platform to make important decisions, establish relationships with 
others in power, and, most importantly, inspire more civilians to their cause.  
 In addition to Boko Haram members gaining political power through corruption, the 
group’s leader, Mohammed Yusuf received political attention as a result of his public 
preaching. 101 The cycle of constituencies flooded with Boko Haram members and group 
leaders gaining political power continued as group membership grew fervently.102 Eventually, 
Yusuf was, “included in the Borno state committee of clerics following the introduction of 
Shar’ia Law.”103 Vaaseh claims that this indicated official corruption and under-the-table 
connections between Boko Haram and influential government leaders. Monetary patronage 
was exchanged between the two groups and they became irreparably connected when after 
being arrested, Yusuf was, “released based on intervention by influential politicians.”104 
 This symbiotic relationship did not last long though. Prior to the 2007 elections, the 
Nigerian government made promises to provide, “basic incentives like financial and material 
resources to Boko Haram members to facilitate the actualization of their ideology,” on a 
monthly basis.105 After politicians reneged on these promises, Boko Haram members attacked 
the government officials’ security agents.106 Then, the government passed the Crash Helmet 
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policy which required all citizens riding a motorcycle to wear a helmet. If citizens were found 
riding a motorcycle without a helmet, they would be arrested and their motorcycle would be 
confiscated. This legislation was directed at Boko Haram as motorcycles were their primary 
mode of transportation. In addition to oppressing the group logistically, the policy was also 
seen by Boko Haram to be founded in Western ideas and therefore a direct insult to the 
group.107 Members became angry at the government’s heavy-handed tactics. 
 While Boko Haram once viewed the government as a means to promote their 
ideology, quickly that vision transformed to portray the government as the source of the 
group’s problems. Beginning on July 26, 2009, Boko Haram took violent action and besieged 
the government for four days. They attacked police, government institutions, schools, and 
churches.108 During the siege, about 50 civilians, 22 suspected militants, two police officers, 
and one prison officer died.109 However, the violence exploded when the Nigerian army was 
deployed to provide aid to the police force. An estimated 800 people were killed by the army 
and about 1,000 Boko Haram members were arrested.110 Furthermore, Mohammed Yusuf and 
other sect leaders were executed publicly without a trial.111 Needless to say, this event created 
even more enmity between the two sides.       
 The hostility between the government and Boko Haram left little room for civilians to 
remain in the middle. When forced to choose, many Nigerian nationals selected the side of the 
insurgents. This was largely due to the extreme measures taken by the Nigerian army. The 
army did not limit their crusade to Boko Haram members. The United Nations Integrated 
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Regional Information Networks news service claimed that Nigerian, “soldiers began shooting 
in the air...breaking into homes, singling out male occupants and shooting them, and driving 
women out of the houses which they set ablaze.”112 According to one Nigerian news source, 
community leaders believed men in villages were killed simply because, “they were from the 
Kanuri ethnic group from which the Boko Haram draws many of its members.”113 The 
Nigerian army also frequently committed atrocities like beheadings and torture.114 Oluwaseun 
Bamidele accredits these actions to, “corruption and ultimately the lack of sustainable, 
responsible, and responsive leadership.”115 As a result we start to see why it becomes hard for 
potential recruits to distinguish between the violence of the government and the violence of 
Boko Haram.          
 According to a study by the U.S. Institute of Peace in 2013, Nigerians criticize their 
own government security and military forces for, “their harsh tactics, which have injured 
civilians and damaged property.”116 The study determined that the extremist narrative so 
present in Nigeria is due in part to corruption in the government and disregard for the welfare 
of citizens. Rationally, citizens join an organization that provides safety and security for them 
– Boko Haram. USIP claims that the, “widespread corruption in Nigeria has not only deprived 
communities of needed amenities and infrastructure but has created an environment conducive 
for recruitment and radicalization.”117 Despite pouring more than a quarter of its national 
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budget into the defeat of Boko Haram, Nigeria is doing more harm than good.118 Nigeria is 
not only harming its own reputation, but it is improving the reputation of Boko Haram by 
allowing the group to provide for Nigerian citizens.  
In addition to this unspoken dynamic, which benefits Boko Haram, the group has 
actively worked to take advantage of the government’s descent in popularity. Posters 
commanding citizens to abandon the government began circulating in northern Nigeria in 
October of 2010.119 Nigerian citizens who perceived oppression from the government viewed 
Boko Haram as a vigilante group fighting for them. Onuoha explains “Itinerant preachers 
capitalize on the situation by preaching an extreme version of religious teachings and 
conveying a narrative of the government as weak and corrupt.”120 Once recruits have joined 
Boko Haram both Boko Haram and the government permanently mark them as members. This 
makes it extremely hard for recruits to change their minds and remove themselves for fear of 
being killed by either group. All of these factors together cause civilians to begin to see 
joining Boko Haram as a rational choice. Many people now joining Boko Haram do so 
because it is a logical choice rather than because they truly have radicalized beliefs. 
C. Recruitment Tactics Used 
From 2009 to 2012, Boko Haram’s method for obtaining new recruits was largely 
person-to-person persuasion. Tactics used involved manipulation of individuals. Boko Haram 
also used tactics such as intimidation, coercion, and extortion.     
 One of the first ways recruitment began for Boko Haram was extortion through micro-
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lending. In the beginning of Boko Haram’s campaign, it obtained a fair amount of financial 
resources from both inside and outside of Nigeria.121 This money was used to provide 
“welfare services to the hordes of jobless, homeless and illiterate.”122 However, it was not 
only impoverished people to whom Boko Haram lent. Boko Haram also obtained wealthy 
recruits through “coercive micro-lending scheme[s].”123 Boko Haram primarily did this by, 
“offering young entrepreneurs loans for small businesses like shops, salons and tailors and 
then forcing them to join the group when they couldn’t repay the loan.”124 As a result of 
feeling “owned” due to indebtedness, new recruits were sucked into Boko Haram.  
 Another way Boko Haram recruits its membership is through coercion. This type of 
coercion comes from individuals that surround and are well known to the person targeted. 
Mercy Corps interviewed many former members who claimed that they were pressured into 
joining the group by their peers. Boko Haram utilizes, “extreme pressure from friends, family, 
or colleagues,” to do their recruiting.125 However, some members considered this excessive 
pressure more as a threat than an effect of social factors. Still, others saw their membership 
more as a result of their own free choice and less so from those pressuring them to join. In all, 
coercion from others plays a large role in Boko Haram’s recruitment playbook.    
Although this coercion may seem like simple intimidation to some, intimidation from 
Boko Haram has a more menacing side. Boko Haram’s intimidation tactic includes 
overwhelming violence. In an interview with Mercy Corps, a young girl explained that as 
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“tactics became more violent, community acceptance started to go;” Boko Haram began 
threatening individuals to join.126 One former member confessed, “I officially joined [Boko 
Haram] when they started killing indiscriminately. I needed protection and immunity from 
persecution by them, so I could continue with my business.”127 Although this man’s 
motivations might seem economically based, it really is a result of his fear of Boko Haram. 
Similar situations have been seen many times. Boko Haram uses violence to maintain fear and 
– as a result – power over members. James Forest claims, “Boko Haram is an enemy of 
moderation and stability; they have chosen to promote a violent ideology.”128 As a result of 
this ideology, anyone not with Boko Haram is an enemy against it, creating a motivation for 
individuals to join for survival.      
D. The Changes in Boko Haram’s Recruitment Tactics    
 After 2012, there was a shift in Boko Haram’s recruitment tactics. Boko Haram started 
kidnapping people in 2012. Boko Haram began abducting, “local rulers, politicians or their 
family members.”129 This soon changed as Boko Haram quickly resorted to targeting young 
adults and children without the intention of returning them. The International Crisis Group 
(ICG) reported young men were forced to join Boko Haram because the group, “threatened to 
behead whomever refused to join.”130        
 In the context of Boko Haram, the terroristic tool of kidnaping has given them much 
success in that they are able to take whomever they want without investing an excessive 
amount of time. They are then brain washed, sold, bred, and used as weapons. According to 
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the work I did, Boko Haram kidnapped approximately 6,277 boys and girls from 2008 to July 
2015.131  These abductees are trained for, “activities ranging from errand running to suicide 
bombings.”132 Jacob Zenn further explains that untrained abductees are used to, “acquire 
intelligence and carry out the first wave of attacks on villages or barracks.”133 If they fail to 
carry out such acts for Boko Haram or show “cowardice,” they, “risk death at the hands of 
their commanders.”134 As a result, these abductees have become forced members of Boko 
Haram.           
 Boko Haram not only abducts men and boys, but they also abduct women. Boko 
Haram seeks to abduct women because according to David Cook, “female suicide-attackers 
have the advantage, inside Nigeria’s conservative Muslim environment, of being able to 
conceal explosives under their garments without attracting undue attention.”135 In Nigeria, it is 
dishonorable to search a Muslim woman. As a result, Boko Haram is able to place explosives, 
“under the girls’ hijabs or clothing and detonated remotely, possibly without [the women] 
knowing.”136 Hence, Boko Haram sees women as valuable and controllable resources or 
members.            
 E. Stockholm Syndrome        
 The question then arises as to how Boko Haram is able to control these hostages. 
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Stockholm syndrome may be the answer. Stockholm syndrome is imbued through four factors 
throughout the kidnapping. The first is that the attacker, “threatens to kill the victim,” and 
appears to have, “the capability to do so.”137 The second factor is that the captive or victim is 
dependent upon the abductor for life. The third factor is that the hostage is isolated from other 
people and only has the captor’s perspective available to him or her. The last factor is seen as 
a cornerstone of Stockholm syndrome; the “captive sees the perpetrator as showing some 
degree of kindness.”138 Through these tactics Boko Haram is able to engraft Stockholm 
syndrome into their kidnapped victims.        
 One of the first signs of instilling Stockholm syndrome into their victims is through 
threatening to kill them. This sign can clearly be seen in almost every instance where Boko 
Haram kidnaps a victim. An interview with a victim, who was kidnapped by Boko Haram, 
shows that Boko Haram threatened to kill her during the abduction. The kidnapped girl 
explained that Boko Haram members, “said that they would kill us and our families and that 
they had complete control over us.”139 Jones explains that this teaches the captive to judge, 
“[I]t safer to align with the perpetrator, endure the hardship of captivity, and comply with the 
captor than to resist and face murder.”140 Hence, the kidnapped of Boko Haram start to 
comply with the deadly group’s bidding.       
 Not only do victims comply with the kidnappers but they also rely on them. The 
interview with the victim also revealed the victims’ dependency on their kidnappers. The 
unnamed female victim explained, “They put up simple perimeter fences made of thorny 
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bushes around the individual camps. …  And there are guards to ensure that nobody escapes. 
There are headcounts mornings and evenings. There is only maize to eat, no meat or 
spices.”141 This statement reflects the detainment of the victims and how they had to depend 
on the Boko Haram members for survival. Jones explains, “A person held in captivity cannot 
escape and depends on the hostage taker for life. The captor becomes the person in control of 
the captive’s basic needs for survival and the victim’s life itself.”142 As a result, it is much 
easier to control and manipulate victims.       
 The reality of captors’ threats and their control of victims’ survival are masked when 
select acts of kindness are shown by captors to the victims. For example, two girls who 
escaped Boko Haram explained how Boko Haram showed kindness after they were threatened 
and captured. Boko Haram members promised to let the girls go home, then later explained 
that they were saving the girls from going, “to school for prostitution.”143 This show of 
kindness from the perpetrator causes the victim to, “submerge the anger they feel in response 
to the terror and concentrate on the captors ‘good side’ to protect themselves.”144 The act of 
survival affects victims’ actions and mindset.      
 One additional factor that changes victims’ mindsets is isolation. Isolation gives the 
victim only one perspective of the world – that of the kidnapper. One former Boko Haram 
member explained that they would tell the girl, “‘It’s OK to be a suicide bomber. It’s 
normal’… that they will go to paradise if they commit suicide for Allah. So, they ask girls, 
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‘Who wants to go to paradise?’”145 It is common for “perpetrators [to] routinely [hide] 
information about the outside world … to keep [victims] totally dependent.”146 Showing only 
this view wears down the girls’ resolve and beliefs until they start to believe what Boko 
Haram is telling them. Some of those who were kidnapped and have since been returned or 
rescued are no longer the same. Psychologically some of these girls and boys no longer 
identify with their former lives. Boko Haram’s beliefs have been engrained in them. As a 
result, the government and Nigerian society have an extremely difficult time viewing these 
youths as victims, but rather see them as current Boko Haram members.147   
 As a result of all of these factors, Boko Haram is able to control their victims. A 
former Boko Haram member described this control by showing how they use these kidnapped 
girls. A member uses a false romantic relationship with a kidnapped girl and tells her that they 
both will wear bombs and meet in paradise after they detonate the bombs.148 However the 
member does not detonate the bomb and lets the girl detonate her own.149 The member then, 
“goes to the next girl to lure her to do the same thing.”150 Death then completes the cycle for 
abducted members of Boko Haram.           
VI. Policy Recommendations       
 Although Nigeria has had difficulty stemming Boko Haram’s activity, Nigeria does 
have the resources to defeat the terrorist organization. Nigeria has the man-power to 
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physically combat Boko Haram, and it has a significant financial income to counter Boko 
Haram. It has a government infrastructure and legal system to maintain law and order. Lastly, 
one of the most important things Nigeria has to combat Boko Haram is its own demography. 
It is through these aforementioned attributes that Nigeria can respond to and defeat Boko 
Haram effectively.          
 Recently the Nigerian government and Boko Haram exchanged four Boko Haram 
prisoners for 21 of the Chibok girls.151 What seemed like a happy ending is actually a grave 
set back. Continuing to negotiate with these terrorist only put more Nigerians at risk. This 
negotiation only teaches Boko Haram that kidnapping more people will get them what they 
want. As a result, Nigeria should institute a policy where it does not negotiate with terrorists 
for the sake of those who could be taken or killed.      
 Another thing the Government can do is to focus on “Countering Violent Extremism” 
(CVE). This model, promoted by the US State Department and the US Agency for 
International Development in the late 2000, does not prevent Nigerians from believing in their 
religions, ideologies, and beliefs that may seem ultra conservative, radical, or extreme. Again, 
it is not what people believe that makes them dangerous, but it is how people execute and 
deploy their beliefs that cause concern. The Nigerian government must prevent its people 
from turning to violence. Kendhammer explains the CVE approach as “drying up the 
recruitment pool for extremist groups by building civic engagement, promoting employment, 
and spreading peace-building messages through local media to ‘inoculate’ vulnerable 
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populations against the appeal of radical ideologies.”152 If this message of peace begins to 
spread, Nigerians will start to think Nigeria holds a brighter future and not be tempted to join 
Boko Haram.           
 The Nigerian government must institute programs to de-radicalize Boko Haram 
suspects already in custody. Killing suspects only enrages the Nigerian people. Releasing 
suspects may only aid to Boko Haram. By de-radicalizing and encouraging these suspects not 
to use violence, the Nigerian government wields a double edge sword. Evidence of this 
program working can be found in other countries including Singapore, Saudi Arabia, the 
United Kingdom, Ireland, and Malaysia “have taken steps to keep an eye on released 
prisoners through police surveillance and family cooperation.”153 This sword allows citizens 
to rally behind the peaceful tactics the government is using and allows these suspects to be 
released and produce an impact in their communities because of their de-radicalization. 
 Northern Nigeria must be approached just as the “Marshall Plan” was executed in 
Western Europe. There must be funding for economic and social development in 
impoverished areas. One of Boko Haram’s tactics in recruiting people is by helping them with 
economic and social development through loans and their support of businesses.154 Once 
recruited, Boko Haram forces them to join the group when they cannot repay the loans, or the 
group demands payment if the business succeeds. If the government provides communities 
economic and social development along with employment opportunities, people will have the 
option of not taking a loan from Boko Haram, hence depriving the group of its recruitment
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 The government must also provide new educational opportunities in these regions. In 
the 1990’s states of Borno and Yobe, Islam education was the only form of education taught 
in primary and secondary schools.155 Many northern communities still do not have access to 
public schools and are forced to send their children to away to Islamic schools. Although there 
is nothing inherently wrong with sending a child to an Islamic school, many Boko Haram 
members prey on students from these schools. Forest explains that children in northern 
Nigeria Islamic schools “receive little education beyond rote memorization of the Koran. 
They receive no money, and are forced to beg in the streets in order to survive.”156 Critics of 
these schools see the schools as “recruiting centre[s] for Jihad and Jihadists to fight the state 
or training school for fanatics, die-hard members, and future suicide bombers.”157 While 
Islamic schools should not be banned, parents should have the opportunity to send their 
children to a different school. The government should offer funding many different types of 
public schools and provide security for these schools to prevent and deter Boko Haram from 
abducting children in its own efforts to recruit.     
 However, much of countering violent extremism relies on religion. The Nigerian 
government must integrate local community and religious leaders in the fight against Boko 
Haram. As James Forest points out, “Muslim leaders in northern Nigeria are seen by many in 
their communities as powerbrokers and trusted mediators of disputes. They draw tacit 
authority by nature of a deep historical Muslim influence in social and political life 
throughout the region.”158 The government must challenge religious leaders to come up with 
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counter narratives to challenge fatwas, like those ISIS and Boko Haram are issuing, which 
justify their violence. Muslim leaders also play an important role in discussions about 
economics, religious insecurities, security, and development projects. In order to do this, 
Forest advices the government to “foster nationwide respect toward all religious faiths, 
equitable distribution.”159 As a result, stability will ensue, and channels of communication 
between government and religious leaders will serve as a way for locals who voice their 
opinions.            
 In order to start winning over the people of Nigeria, the government needs to start 
cracking down on its own corruption and establish legitimacy. Forest claims that sometimes 
there is violence between the army and the police over resources.160 In addition to changing 
the focus and corruption of the security forces, authorities should address human rights 
violations that have been committed against Boko Haram. Though Boko Haram is committing 
many atrocities and not being held accountable for its actions, it does not excuse the army and 
police forces of Nigeria to do the same.  Atrocity for Atrocity is never justified. Both sides are 
guilty of human rights violations.  
Vaaseh states that it would be a start for the government to: 
[I]dentify and prosecute the killers of Muhammad Yusuf, Boko Haram’s founder; hold 
fair trials for accused sect members; end torture of detainees and extra- judicial 
executions of civilians, and prosecute those responsible; investigate the involvement of 
political elites in sponsoring the early Boko Haram; and hold C-JTF leaders 
accountable for abuses.161 
 
By holding itself accountable, the government will be seen as, and will ultimately be, more 
reliable. This will also remove some of its scrutiny and put it on a level above Boko Haram. 
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By the Government holding itself accountable trust will start to be rebuilt between it 
and the Nigerian Citizens. It will also portraying a more powerful narrative of the reliability of 
the government. The Nigerian government is currently seen as being against Muslims. Instead 
it should invest in portraying itself as a force against Boko Haram. Vaaseh explains that this 
would curtail “investigating inter-religious violence, empowering prosecutors to hold 
perpetrators accountable, and promoting reconciliation for past conflicts.”162 By establishing 
its moral and political legitimacy, the Nigerian government would be able to counter the 
narrative of Boko Haram. Forest claims, “Legitimacy and trust are key aspects of any 
audience’s willingness to accept a message.”163 Furthermore, if the country regains the trust of 
the people, Boko Haram members may start to develop doubt and fear, “undermin[ing] 
confidence and diminish the organization’s operational capabilities” within.164 
 An additional strategy for Nigeria to combat Boko Haram is to improve its operational 
intelligence. Forest concurs saying that “members of the Nigerian Army have come to despise 
the local police.”165 However, it is in repairing this relationship that may be the difference in 
defeating Boko Haram. The two need to exchange information and keep communication 
channels open. Having a rivalry and animosity between them only jeopardizes the Nigerian 
people.           
 This improved intelligence will help uncover difficult to find Boko Haram members. 
Haybeck claims that terrorist groups like Boko Haram have “embed[ed] themselves in the 
population.” 166 She explains further that these groups “intermarry, … creat[ing] communities 
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that are ethnically distinct, and then merge themselves with the local population … creating 
radicalized communities.”167 By communicating and exchanging intelligence, security forces 
can unearth Boko Haram members and begin to disrupt these radicalized communities.      
VII. Conclusion          
 My research showed surprising results. In light of my borrowed theory from David 
Cook, I was not able to show a direct correlation from tribal particularism to Boko Haram’s 
recruitment. These tribal ethics, tactics, and anger are not transferred as much as I had 
hypothesized. However, the tribal community of Kanuri is very much a part of who Boko 
Haram is and chooses to be. While I was incorrect in my hypothesis with tribal particularism, 
I was able to discover evidence that supports the expectations of the rational choice theory and 
the Stockholm syndrome phenomenon. Surprisingly, the Nigerian government in many ways 
has forced citizens to choose between the lesser of two evils, causing many to support and join 
Boko Haram over the government. Furthermore, as it turns out, Boko Haram’s selection of 
young male, but most recently female, recruits through abductions heavily involves 
brainwashing. This brainwashing causes youth to turn against previous beliefs and join Boko 
Haram in its fight.           
 The Nigerian government will most likely never find a silver bullet to take out 
terrorism. This is the case for all countries involving terrorism. The only way to not have 
terrorism in a country, is by not having terrorists. However because of allowing and 
nourishing the seed of a terror group in Nigeria, it is impossible to eliminate all terrorist 
ideologies, but, as indicated in this thesis, there are steps the Nigerian government can take to 
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